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introdUction
Aceh is a small autonomous region situated in Sumatra, Indonesia. 
Violence had ravaged the region for twenty ive years as a result of 
a conlict between the separatist group, the gam, and Indonesian 
armed forces until 2005.42 A peace deal, the Memorandum of 
Understanding (moU),43 was inally brokered between the warring 
parties by Crisis Management Initiative (cmi) in August 2005. What 
is unique about this peace deal is that its implementation was moni-
tored and overseen by a joint mission between the EU and ive asEan 
member states, called the Aceh Monitoring Mission (amm). he EU 
was not an acceptable mediator as such but was able to support the 
track-1 mediation process led by private mediator, cmi. his chapter 
seeks to analyse the role of the EU in the peace process in Aceh with 
a view to assessing whether this could be a successful transferrable 
model in a peace mediation context. 
42 For further analysis of the conlict in Aceh see N hIggINS, Regulating the Use of Force in Wars 
of National Liberation: he Need for a New Regime. A Study of the South Moluccas and Aceh, 
Martinus Nijhof, he Netherlands, 2010, pp. 193 – 211. 
43 Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh 
Movement. Available at: http://www.who.int/hac/crises/international/asia_tsunami/sitrep/en/.
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pE acE nEgoti ations in acEh
A number of previous (and ultimately unsuccessful) mediation 
attempts44 had been undertaken in Aceh before the negotiations 
which led to the MoU. However, the work of the cmi, led by Martti 
Ahtisaari, began at a time when both of the conlicting parties were 
eager to see a conclusion to the conlict, an eagerness which was 
ampliied in the aftermath of the December 2004 tsunami which 
devastated Aceh and many other surrounding areas.45 he tragedy 
provided an impetus for the parties to bring peace to the region and 
they entered peace negotiations in January 200546 under the auspices 
of the cmi.47 he cmi prepared the MoU, which was signed by the 
Indonesian Minister for Law and Human Rights, Hamid Awaludin, 
and Malik Mahmud of the gam leadership in Helsinki on 15 August 
2005.48 he MoU itself contains various provisions regarding the 
governance of Aceh and it foresaw the adoption of new legislation on 
governance in the region.49 
thE acEh monitor ing mission
Article 5 of the MoU foresaw the establishment of the Aceh Monitor-
ing Mission (amm).50 he EU and asEan contributing countries 
were tasked with the establishment of the amm, which would be 
responsible for monitoring, among other things, the disarmament 
and demobilisation of gam members and the relocation of non-
organic Indonesian military and police forces. Article 6 empowered 
the amm to settle any disputes which could arise between the parties, 
44 With regard to the mediation attempts in Aceh, see N hIggINS and B dALy, ‘Resolving armed 
conlict: he Acehnese experience of mediation’ (2010) 7(3) US-China Law Review, pp. 1 – 14.
45 See ‘After 29 years, an Aceh peace pact’, Christian Science Monitor (2007). Available at:  
http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0718/p06s02-woap.htm,.
46 Malik Mahmud in an interview with Kanis dursin in he Jakarta Post on his irst visit to Aceh in 
over thirty years. He had been living in exile in Sweden. he Jakarta Post, Sunday, 28 May 2006.
47 See the oicial website of the organisation at http://www.cmi.i/.
48 Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh 
Movement, available at: http://www.who.int/hac/crises/international/asia_tsunami/sitrep/en/.
49 he Law on Governing Aceh, Law No. 11/2006, was passed on 11 July, 2006. he text of this 
piece of legislation is available at: http://www.acheh-eye.org/data_iles/english_format/
indonesia_government/indogovt_decrees/indogovt_decrees_2006_08_01_11.pdf.
50 he website of the Aceh Monitoring Mission is:  
http://www.aceh-mm.org/english/info_menu/archive.htm 
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with regard to amnesties, etc., and to investigate violations of the 
MoU. he amm’s rulings were binding on all parties, and it is clear 
that it was given a vital role in ensuring the successful implementa-
tion of the MoU. However, it is important to note that the role of the 
amm was not to mediate; this activity came within the sole remit 
of the cmi. Rather, the amm ensured that the mediated agreement 
was adhered to and implemented efectively and eiciently. his 
oversight and monitoring aspect of the mediation process is one 
which had been overlooked in previous mediation attempts in Aceh, 
and is one of the main reasons behind the success of the MoU.51 It is 
clear, therefore, that the EU was not the main mediation actor in the 
Acehnese peace process, but it did play a vital supporting role.
he amm was a civilian crisis management mission within the 
framework of the European Security and Defence Policy (Esdp) and 
was comprised of people from various backgrounds of expertise. It 
included monitors from the EU, Norway, Switzerland and ive asEan 
states (Brunei, Malaysia, he Philippines, Singapore and hailand). 
his was the irst EU Esdp mission in Asia and also the irst mission 
which combined the EU and members of asEan. 
The amm was launched on 15 September 2005 for an initial 
period of 6 months, and followed on from the imp interim monitor 
which oversaw the signing of the MoU. Its mandate was extended 
three times and it finally completed its mandate of monitoring and 
supporting the peace process in Aceh on 15 December 2006. The 
mission was led by Mr Pieter Feith (EU Council Secretariat) and 
comprised approximately 230 unarmed personnel from participat-
ing countries, who were divided between 11 District Offices and 4 
Mobile Decommissioning teams, with a headquarters in Banda Aceh. 
€9 million was provided by the EU through the cfsp budget and a 
further €6 million was contributed by EU states and other partici-
pating states.
he amm organised weekly meetings between the gam, govern-
ment representatives, members of the military and the police in order 
to deal with and try to resolve di culties with regard to the imple-
mentation of the MoU, which were known as Commission on Security 
Arrangements (cosa) meetings. hese were supplemented by District 
meetings (Dicosa). hese meetings were central to the success of 
51 See e ASPINALL, ‘he Helsinki Agreement: A More Promising Basis for Peace in Aceh?’, Policy 
Studies 20, East-West Center, Washington, 2005, p. 47.
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the amm as they facilitated dialogue between all parties on a regular 
basis and allowed di culties to be resolved before they escalated into 
insurmountable problems.52
It has been claimed that the peace process in Aceh succeeded 
“beyond all expectations”,53 with a lot of the success attributed to the 
strong enforcement mechanism built into the MoU in the form of the 
amm.54 he decommissioning of weapons and release of amnestied 
gam prisoners went smoothly55, with the gam handing over all of its 
weapons to the amm and disbanding its military wing (tna) in 2005. 
Tentara Negara Indonesia (tni) (the Indonesian military) personnel 
also withdrew without too much trouble or delay from Aceh under 
the terms of the MoU and with oversight from the amm.56 However, 
some criticisms have been levelled at the mission’s lack of progress 
with regard to human rights issues. Under the MoU, the amm was 
tasked with monitoring the human rights situation after the estab-
lishment of both the mission and a Human Rights Court and Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission.57 
thE EU in acEh
he involvement of the EU in Aceh has been multifaceted. It had 
inancially supported previous attempts at peace negotiations before 
the MoU and was also heavily involved in Aceh due to tsunami relief 
52 See k SchuLze, Mission Not So Impossible. he Aceh Monitoring Mission and Lessons Learned 
for the EU, International Policy Analysis Report, Berlin 2007, p.4.
53 INterNAtIoNAL crISIS grouP, Aceh: So Far, So Good, Asia Brieing Number 44, Jakarta / 
Brussels, dec 13 2005). See also INterNAtIoNAL crISIS grouP, Aceh: Now for the Hard Part, 
Asia Brieing Number 48, Jakarta / Brussels, Mar 29 2006). here have been some instances 
of violence in the region since the signing of the MoU which have been generally attributed to 
pro-independence groups — see worLd BANk / deceNtrALISAtIoN SuPPort FAcILty, Aceh 
Conlict Monitoring Update, May 2007. Available at: http://www.conlictanddevelopment.org/
data/doc/en/regCaseStudy/aceh/mon/Aceh%20Conlict%20Monitoring%20Update%20
-%20May%202007.pdf.
54 See generally, k SchuLze, Mission Not So Impossible. he Aceh Monitoring Mission and Lessons 
Learned for the EU, International Policy Analysis Report, Berlin 2007.
55 INterNAtIoNAL crISIS grouP, Aceh: So Far, So Good, Asia Brieing Number 44, Jakarta / 
Brussels, dec 13 2005), at 2. 
56 See k SchuLze, Mission Not So Impossible. he Aceh Monitoring Mission and Lessons Learned 
for the EU, International Policy Analysis Report, Berlin 2007, p.7.
57 Idem., pp. 8 – 9.
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and reconstruction work.58 he European Commission provided a 
grant for a period of six months to facilitate the peace talks which led 
to the signing of the MoU. hese talks were also endorsed by Javier 
Solana, High Representative for the cfsp. herefore, the EU already 
had a stakeholder role in the peace process in Aceh before the estab-
lishment of the amm.59 his role facilitated the eventual involvement 
of the EU in the amm and the monitoring of the implementation of 
the MoU. However, it is important to remember that the EU was not 
the only funder of the negotiations and that the role of the smaller 
funders, such as Finland and he Netherlands, was crucial so that 
the negotiations could actually be launched. he EU funding was 
provided one month later.
While the role of the EU was vital to the achievement of a lasting 
peace deal, it is doubtful if an organisation such as the EU would have 
been successful in bringing peace to the region on its own. Indonesia 
did not want to internationalise the Acehnese conlict, particularly in 
the aftermath of the unsuccessful involvement of the Un in Timor-
Leste,60 and therefore the EU would not have been an acceptable 
mediator. It is clear that the multi-track mediation61 approach was 
necessary to address the requirements of the parties to the conlict, 
so co-operation with, and the support of, the cmi was a very suitable 
role for the EU.
he relationship with the asEan states was also very important 
in ensuring the implementation of the MoU, with the Asian states 
having a better understanding of the culture and history of the people 
of the region and the EU having strong logistical capacities.
58 See ‘eu Ends Peace Monitoring Program in Aceh’, he Jakarta Post, Friday May 25, 2012. In total 
the eu and member states donated €1.5 billion for all tsunami-afected areas, most of which 
was eventually channelled to the Indonesian Multi-donor Trust Fund. 
59 See k SchuLze, Mission Not So Impossible. he Aceh Monitoring Mission and Lessons Learned 
for the EU, International Policy Analysis Report, Berlin 2007, p. 3.
60 ‘hank You eu’, he Jakarta Post, Monday May 28, 2012.
61 See d chIgAS, ‘Track II (Citizen) diplomacy’ in Beyond Intractability. G Burgess and H Burgess 
(eds), Conlict Research Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder, 2003. Available at: http://
www.beyondintractability.org/bi-essay/track2-diplomacy 
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r EcommEndations basEd on  
thE EXpEr iEncE of thE EU in acEh
Given the success of the MoU, which has led to a fairly stable period 
of peace in Aceh since 2005, it is interesting to note what lessons can 
be learned from the Acehnese experience and whether the Acehnese 
model is one which could be transferred to other areas and other 
conlict resolution initiatives. However, it must irst be emphasised 
that one thing which cannot be replicated in other peace process 
is the readiness of the parties to engage in dialogue with a view to 
the completion of a peace agreement. his ‘readiness’, or, to use 
Zartman’s62 phrase, ‘ripeness’, cannot be forced. In Aceh, both of the 
conlicting parties were open to dialogue. In addition, the tsunami 
provided a further push towards the urgent settlement of the dispute. 
In addition, two of the main challenges with regard to the EU’s role 
in Aceh were funding and training.63 here was di culty in releasing 
money at short notice, while the training was ad hoc and, at irst, 
“rudimentary”.64 However, the establishment of the European External 
Action Service in 2010 should help to avoid, or at least decrease, fund-
ing and training di culties in future EU mediation activities.
Based on the role of the EU and the amm in the Acehnese peace 
process, a number of recommendations for future similar activities 
can be made:
he EU efectively supported the mediation process in Aceh 
through their role in the amm, although it would not have 
been accepted as a mediator. he role of the EU was vital, both 
in terms of funding and the monitoring of the MoU, to securing peace in 
Aceh. he EU can, therefore, play various roles in future peace processes, 
depending on how they are viewed by the conlicting parties. Its 
expertise in logistics and obvious funding capabilities mean that many 
states and groups would desire a role for the EU in a mediation process. 
However, this role must be clariied and agreed on by all parties. 
62 See I zArtmAN, ‘he Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments’,1(1) he 
Global Review of Ethnopolitics, 2001, pp. 8 – 18 and I zArtmAN, Escalation and Negotiation in 
International Conlicts, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005.
63 See k SchuLze, Mission Not So Impossible. he Aceh Monitoring Mission and Lessons Learned 
for the EU, International Policy Analysis Report, Berlin 2007, p. 5.
64 Ibid.
Acceptability
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Co-operation with the asEan states was central to the 
success of the amm. he understanding of, and sensitivity 
to, local culture, history and context are vital to ensuring the success 
of an external actor in a peace process. Similar co-operation with 
asEan and other regional organisations is to be recommended in any 
future EU mediation activities outside the EU.
Given the multifaceted capacities of the EU, its mandate in 
future mediation activities could be expanded to post-
conlict and peacebuilding activities. In Aceh, the role of the amm 
was to monitor and enforce the MoU. However, there were calls for 
the EU and the amm to continue their work for longer than they did. 
While the EU continued to inancially support various projects in the 
region, some felt that it could have stayed on longer and supported 
additional peacebuilding activities in Aceh. 65 In agreeing mandates 
for future peace processes, the possibility of encouraging EU partici-
pation in peacebuilding activities, as well as the length of its involve-
ment in such activities, should be considered.
he amm consisted of staf who had expertise in various 
backgrounds, which was important to the successful 
implementation of the MoU. A similar approach should be taken in 
future EU mediation activities. Given the central role that human 
rights disputes often play in conlict situations, experts in this ield 
should form part of the mediation team. However, the issue of 
cultural relativism must be taken into account, and staf with a 
background in the region and/or insight into the culture of the 
people in question should be selected.
One of the main factors in the success of the amm was the 
series of regular meetings it convened between all the 
stakeholders in the peace process (cosa meetings). hese 
meetings acted as a form of preventative diplomacy, and this model 
should be employed in future mediation activities.
65 Interview with Bahktiar Abdullah, gAm Spokesperson, 13 September 2010.
Co-operation
Mandate
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Continuing 
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conclUsion
he EU’s broad peace support programme, which included the amm, 
inished in June 2012.66 his kind of long-term support is important 
when implementing the agreement and strengthening local capaci-
ties. In Aceh there would have been a willingness to see the EU 
continue its support even longer, but this was not as welcomed by 
the Indonesian government. he EU, for political reasons, is not able 
to focus on peace-related support, but it is committed to continuing 
its active interest in the region with attention on other issues. EU 
representative Giovanni Serritella said that the EU will continue to 
support forestry, environmental, climate-change and economic 
development programmes in Aceh in the future.67 Given the success 
of the amm, it is clear that the EU has the capacity to engage in future 
peace processes outside its own region, as long as it considers the 
limitations highlighted in this chapter.
66 See ‘eu Ends Peace Monitoring Program in Aceh’, he Jakarta Post, 25 May, 2012.
67 ‘hank You eu’, he Jakarta Post, 28 May, 2012.
